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Abstract: South-South dynamic migrations offer the opportunity to some impoverished countries to 
establish a Diaspora outside their territorial bases in the perspective to address the issues raised by 
this phenomenon of extreme poverty from abroad. First of all, it is noteworthy that the volume of 
South-South dynamic migrations rises to more than 61 million people, versus 62 million people in the 
South-North dynamic migrations. In other words, this increased propensity to mobility, which 
represents almost one billion people, nowadays concerns parts of the world that face extreme poverty 
respectively. The analysis of South-South dynamic migrations will focus our attention on one aspect 
of globalization that studies and expertise tend to avoid by focusing only on trading, goods and capital 
services. Apart from these various elements that contribute to globalization, it is necessary to include 
international migration to make the analysis more comprehensive. To paraphrase the words of the 
analyst Bruno Hérault, there is a new trend emerging in the context of the occurring exchanges 
between the two countries. However, according to the authors of the report posted by the UNDP in 
2009, migration flows can be understood as a major vector for human development. In this regard, the 
report in question requires States to remove barriers in order to promote human development and 
allow human mobility. 
Keywords: center-local relations; urban and rural development; social policies; social stratification 
and social groups 
 
1. Introduction 
The theme of Chinese migrants in Antananarivo has been tackled by the 
geographer Catherine Fournet - Guerin, and that of Chinese migrants in Dakar, by 
the political scientist Antoine Kernen. In the context of this paper, it will be argued 
that the potential success of this globalization, which starts with the South, is based 
above all on the success of expatriate Chinese traders. This South-South migration 
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flow, to put it that way, navigates through fields of contradictory powers, and may 
appear in this regard as an intrusion on a firm ground (Hérault, 2006, pp. 4-5). To 
what extent expatriate Chinese traders would play an important role both in the 
economic life of Behoririka and Dakar, and this with their respective working 
methods? And what could be the overall impact of this dynamic South-South 
migration? The only substantial way to assess the legitimacy of a power is by 
gathering the views of those over whom it is exercised. The analysis of the 
international South-South migration, specifically targeting Chinese newcomers in 
Antananarivo (Fournet-Guérin, 2009, pp. 544), is an invitation to look at the way 
China – as an emerging country – is considering its geopolitical approach to Africa. 
Is its strategy in line with the socio-economic context, or is it disconnected?  
- Firstly, a typology of different Chinese expatriates in Africa will be made 
in order to discuss the content of this South- South migration and highlight 
the various motives behind migration routes (Tarrius, 2002). 
- Secondly, this paper will analyze the step in relation to their local presence, 
with a focus on Chinese traders in Madagascar and Senegal, understood as 
the new Chinese migrants from Antananarivo and Dakar, from 2003 to 
2012. 
 
2. Typology of a South /South Migration Flow 
The 750,000 Chinese expatriates in Africa are part of a South-South migration 
phenomenon that can be considered as lateral (Nguyen, 2009, pp. 52). According to 
figures provided by the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, 
of a total of 672,724 migrant workers from China, it is noteworthy that 24,240 of 
them come from Fujian Province. Furthermore, we will see how the reasons for 
expatriation towards Africa differ from one category of Chinese migrants, as 
mentioned below, to another (Nguyen, 2009, pp. 52). Not only they allow us to 
insist on the characteristics of this South-South migration flow but also to split it 
into four categories of immigrants, highlight the importance of expatriation 
patterns and reveal its skeleton: 
Chinese merchants and self-entrepreneur expatriates in Africa are actors whose 
objective is to make money outside of their country since the 1990s. They are those 
who – as investors and newcomers of the latest decade – manage to find their way 
into the heart of the society in which they wish to settle down, and this in spite of a 
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lack of resources, while being relatively effective. Once there, Chinese traders and 
entrepreneurs need one or more “key resource persons” to assist them in the 
development of their business. In the way of the Huaquio, this category of 
immigrants also plays the role of investors, although their access to credit remains 
difficult. They are not necessarily graduates. Some of them, driven by the desire to 
make money, have deliberately chosen to change occupations during their careers, 
while others, especially those from lower income groups, only aspire to improve 
their living conditions thanks to trading businesses. Hence, there is a kind of 
porosity between coolies and traders. This category of immigrants does not seem to 
receive directives issued by the central government. Thus, and particularly for 
marketers and entrepreneurs who wish to settle permanently in Africa, there is a 
great concern over this category of immigrants. While most of them are of Chinese 
nationality, it is possible to also meet people in possession of a Hong Kong or 
French nationality. 
Indeed, in 1990, the handover of Hong Kong to China has also conditioned the 
arrival of Chinese in Africa. From these observations, what appears very clearly is 
a strong representation of middle-aged men in this activity area. According to the 
Malagasy newspaper La Gazette of the Big Island, it seems that this economic 
migration is also the fact of single women who have no more ties with their 
country of origin. 
The Huaquio are a wider category than the previous one. A large majority of them 
are graduates willing to build a strong international experience before seeking 
higher positions, and before rising up in the ranks inherent to the central 
government, either in the private or public sector. As the thugs of the Chinese 
central government, they can be found leading the 900 major Chinese companies 
who officiate in Africa since the 1990s. Some of them were senior officials before 
moving into the private sector, others have taken the necessary steps in order to be 
promoted to higher positions such as the one of Ministry of Commerce. 
Such as, the central government strongly relies on them to orchestrate China’s 
African policy (Alden, 2008, pp. 119-133). These are the actors who receive 
specific directives from Beijing, and who are responsible for negotiating bilateral 
agreements with representatives of countries in receipt of China’s aid. They are 
also the main interlocutors of African regimes. In the context of such proceedings, 
they are welcomed as delegations by African elites. Moreover, they are among 
many foreign investors who transfer funds to Africa.  
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Indeed, unlike traders and entrepreneurs, access to credit is facilitated by the 
central government. The embassy staff, consuls, senior officials, diplomats and 
cooperating agents are state actors working directly with the central government. It 
is noteworthy that from 1982 they were then recruited on the basis of an open 
competition which main content was language proficiency and a specialized 
knowledge of the region in which they were expected to be transferred. Most of 
them have been trained in the China Foreign Affairs University; a training centre 
for future Chinese diplomatic staff. 
Hence, Beijing has made every effort to diversify the profile of its diplomats 
ensuring on the one hand, the professionalization of the staff in charge of foreign 
policy, and on the other hand, by making them more effective for law and 
international trade. As a result, ideology is relegated in the background.  
In the light of the typology developed above, which classifies the various 
components inherent to this South-South migration of an inter-continental nature, it 
appears that some of them will necessarily come across other local migrants from 
Africa. This intra-continental route differs somewhat from that of the Chinese’s, be 
it in the peculiar aspect of their paths. On the other hand, African and Chinese 
migrants coincide in some respects in the motives that drive them to escape the 
phenomenon of poverty that afflicts their country of origin. As such, it appears that 
a complementary relationship may arise between some sections of Chinese 
migrants and certain segments of the African population. Regarding migration of 
coastal intra-continental from the periphery to the centre: different starting points 
being different towns, or neighbouring regions and impoverished provinces, and 
Antananarivo being the place of arrival. Originally, according to Hubert 
Deschamps, coastal people like many other Malagasy left their native country for 
the capital or for other major cities in order to be hired as part of seasonal and / or 
temporary works as labourers, rickshaw pullers or dock workers. 
In fact, intra-continental migration movements could not be considered as 
definitive, and were not drawn exclusively from coastal community. In the past, it 
was not thus a question of exodus as such.  
Before the arrival of Chinese newcomers in Antananarivo, the goal of the actors of 
this intra-continental mobility from Malagasy peripheral regions to the centre of 
the country was thus to supplement the active members of the nuclear family in the 
management of day-to-day needs. Indeed, the use of the latter having been 
weakened – particularly in the agricultural sector – because of restrictive measures 
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of budget expenses, which also led many Malagasy schoolboys and students to 
give up their studies, different households in the countryside and surrounding 
provinces had to face this hardship. 
Following the arrival of large number of Chinese traders from the 1990s, those who 
will therefore benefit from this phenomenon are small street dealers from the coast 
of Madagascar, who will soon become their main customers, and manage to fill 
their moneybags. In other words, the recent arrival of Chinese traders and the 
social emergence of a new Chinese community in Antananarivo, are two most 
timely phenomena for coastal intra-continental migrants, whose objective is to find 
a job. These two related migration flows have resulted in a kind of agreement over 
best interests for both parties; a correlation of a meeting between Chinese migrants 
and Malagasy people. 
Moreover, given the many places in Antananarivo where, not only street vendors 
sell Chinese products (including textiles), and in the light of the huge number of 
Chinese shops that are now present in the streets of the capital, it makes sense to 
attribute the dynamism that characterizes the urban local retail trade to the 
development of a Chinatown in the very heart of Behoririka. Therefore, this social 
change, instilled by the arrival of Chinese traders in Antananarivo, provides an 
opportunity for some segments of the Malagasy population, especially small 
retailers, on the one hand to incorporate, and on the other hand, to access a form of 
socialization through informal trade. For their part, the Chinese newcomers 
optimize their trading exchanges thanks to this collaboration, relying on small 
dealers who, in this respect, act as resource persons. 
Merina traders (Malagasy people from highlands also called Hovas) and Karana 
(Indo-Pakistani), who were hitherto and undoubtedly accustomed to dominate the 
commercial sectors of the Malagasy capital, had to pander just after the massive 
arrival of Chinese retailers in Madagascar, and their range of products 
manufactured at low cost that swept the heart of the market. First, unlike the 
coastal migrants, these two ethnic groups live in the capital. Unable to lower their 
prices to the level of Chinese traders – which are significantly lower than those of 
the local market – the Karana and Merina are severely affected by the 
repercussions of this phenomenon. Firstly, the result of the Chinese settlement in 
Behoririka, which is a consequential phenomenon to this South-South migration 
flow from China to Madagascar, is noticeable. Secondly, a profusion of 
manufactured goods coming from China can also be found in the heart of the 
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Malagasy market. The inflation phenomenon, born in the 1980s, which was long 
under the control of the Merina and Karana traders, because of higher selling 
prices, has more or less been stemmed by allowing more purchasing power to the 
most disadvantaged Malagasy families. It is not only the competition in which 
Karana and Merina traders are forced into that undermine their interests. Indeed, 
the Merina are faced with a kind of power embodied by a collective being: a host 
of Chinese actors, operating as networks and exercising a singular influence in a 
horizontal and private way. The fact of having classified and identified them gives 
us the opportunity to define the exercise of such a power, not in the Weberian 
sense, understood in its vertical binding and state dimension, but very far from all, 
in a Foucaldian statement, in which it appears as the result of a multiplicity of 
actors involved in the same social body. Moreover, the typology of Chinese 
migrants mentioned above allows us to unravel the tangle that represents the 
Chinese community of Antananarivo, identify Sino-Malagasy social interactions 
that govern it and use it. Finally, whenever possible, this classification gives us the 
means to identify the collective logics and / or individuals to which Chinese and / 
or Malagasy actors adhere unanimously. At Behoririka, one of the places where 
Chinese and coastal interests are entrenched, few Merina and Karana traders 
manage to adapt to this new mode of economic and commercial operation. In sum, 
Chinese’s commercial interests collide those of Merina and Karana, while they 
branch out with the commercial interests of coastal people. Moreover, by force of 
circumstance, rather than confront them, most Merina and Karana have decided to 
give way to the Chinese merchants, then to settle near Behoririka. Like the Isotry 
market, which is in this respect a place of refuge by the border, where the Karana 
are more or less away from the Chinese community present in the capital.  
Thus settled in an area which virtually looks like their last trading stronghold, the 
Karana strive to mitigate the effects of Chinese competition on the economic and 
commercial field in Antananarivo. 
Therefore, it seems that Chinese traders from Antananarivo have immediately 
proved themselves as competitors, ignoring state force’s presence and jeopardizing 
local production. 
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3. The Socio-Economic Anchor of the New Chinese Migrants to 
Madagascar (2003-2012) 
The earlier waves of Chinese migrants to Madagascar occurred from 1896 to 1901. 
They came from the Canton province toward Tamatave, while the recent waves of 
Chinese migrants toward Île Rouge came primarily, in the early 90s, from the 
Fujian province, under the chairmanship of Albert Zafy, to settle directly in the 
Malagasy capital. Antananarivo then already included a Chinese presence and for 
14,000 nationals trading was a main activity. 
These are the earlier waves of newcomer immigrants that have imported into the 
capital of Madagascar this means of transport called “rickshaw” for which a fee 
applies. The Cantonese newcomers coming from China arrived in Madagascar 
between 1786 and 1830 that is to say, in the premises of the French colonial period. 
Firstly as coolies (Ma Mung, 2000, pp. 21), when trading economy reached its 
peak upon request of Gallieni, with a view to build the rail network that still 
connects today the axes: Fianarantsoa / Manakara Antananarivo / Antsirabe 
Antananarivo and / Tamatave. 
The goal of Chinese coolies employed by France was to return home after having 
honoured their contracts. However, the importation of this Asian labour in 
Madagascar gave rise to an illegal presence of some Chinese who have decided to 
desert the construction sites because of the difficult conditions imposed by the 
French capital. Most of them eventually settled in a scattered manner and without 
any specific strategy as far as their social settlement in Madagascar is concerned. 
They are equally settled in Tamatave, Nosy Be, Antananarivo and Mahajanga. 
Some among the first Chinese migrants were even called to positions of deputies 
(Gema Guillaume was Chinese by his father, Anique Kenbazanamy and Horace 
Mann Thu June) or Senators (Catherine Chan Ah-Line, Ted Von Them 
Andrianasolo and Jean-Yves Mac Tong-Ki) in the Malagasy Republic. 
All these Malagasy personalities of Chinese origin might have to become the 
interlocutors of the Huaquio population. However, their emotional ties to their 
homeland remain distant. For others, some have found it more useful to turn to 
retail or to the food industry in the remote areas of the capital. 
After 1949, when the People's Republic of China was born, migrants from other 
provinces like Guangzhou, Fujian and Zhejiang have followed the first waves of 
migration and have later become Overseas Chinese. While the reasons of the 
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newcomers were mainly economic, this wave of migration is driven by motives of 
a political, economic and demographic nature: the flight from Maoism, the access 
to a labour contract or overcrowding conditions. In the same way as their 
predecessors, they are also spread over the Red Island without necessarily trying to 
build an expatriate community with their compatriots. 
Each one of them has respectively opted for an economic and commercial activity, 
of a self-entrepreneurial type in the retail sector. However, unlike their successors 
of the 1990s (Cabestan, 2010, pp. 377), and those who followed in the 2000s who 
had a strong socio-economic impact on the Malagasy situation, the spatial dispersal 
of the newcomers has reduced the possibility to generate any social changes. 
However, getting to know whether such a goal was or not part of the prerogatives 
of the first Chinese migrants of Madagascar is far from being obvious.  
In this particular case, as we shall see later, the same does not apply to the Chinese 
newcomers in Antananarivo, although the typology will help us to identify the 
shifts that may occur between the different categories. 
Antananarivo city has undergone many urban transformations in less than 350 
years of existence. In addition, the recent arrival of Chinese migrants in the district 
of Behoririka goes along with those recent social economic and urban changes that 
we intend to study here. Indeed, the Malagasy capital has benefited from Chinese 
assistance for many infrastructure constructions such as: le Palais des sports et de 
la culture and the Mahamasina stadium. As an example, we can cite the Chinese 
company called Anhueï Foreign Economic Group, present in Madagascar for the 
last twenty years, which received a public contract by ministerial decree for the 
construction of offices in a district located in Antananarivo and that is called “the 
sixty-seven acres”. 
The company must honour this order within ten years and four years have passed 
since the award of a public contract in 2008. On site, employees work from 7:00 
am to 5:30 pm. There are about 200 employees in total, and only 10 of them are 
Chinese foremen who oversee the work of 190 other Malagasy workers and 
coolies. Chinese employees live on the construction site, in dormitories, at the rear 
of the site. These dormitories are also the offices of the company. As for the 
Malagasy employees, they go home once their daily work is completed. However, 
besides many infrastructural renovations carried out by Chinese companies, it 
seems that the arrival of Chinese newcomers from Behoririka has also had an 
impact on the urban Malagasy capital. 
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From now on, it will therefore be necessary to carefully trace the specific path of 
Chinese traders from Antananarivo, in order to assess its impact on the city centre. 
First, a description will be made of the administrative procedure to which Chinese 
traders are submitted prior to the step in respect to the regularization of their stay as 
independent investors on the Malagasy soil. Depending on the type of requests 
from the Chinese actors – may they come from either employees or investors – 
regulatory documents will vary. In addition to visas and passports, Chinese 
investors should obtain an official document in addition to the previous documents, 
namely, the CIPENS card (The professional identity card for unemployed 
foreigners). In contrast, Chinese employees will have an obligation to be in 
possession of similar identity cards to those of their compatriot’s, the only 
difference being that their employee status requires a work permit that will regulate 
their stay for a period of three years renewable. Upon acquisition of the CIPENS 
card, the regional branch of trade Analamanga requires from different economic 
operators a number of items to be added to their file, namely a supporting 
information sheet that includes: first and last names, date and place of birth and 
nationality. Their home address, place and date of issue of the residence card and / 
or passport will also have to be stated. Finally, the name of the class activity and 
written notification of the applicant stating the CIPENS card application will have 
to be mentioned.  
Regarding the documents for a new application, investors are asked to address a 
handwritten letter to the regional directorate of the Analamanga trade, an extract of 
the criminal record from the country of origin issued within the last three months, a 
work permit or employment for former employees (a certified copy), passport, 
residence permit and visa, for foreign residents, the tax position of the company. A 
photocopy of the status of the company, a certificate of existence of original place 
of operation issued from Fokontany, and finally, two recent passport photos. For 
any modifications or changes in circumstances: a handwritten letter to be addressed 
to the regional directorate of the Analamanga trade, a photocopy of the status of the 
company, the minutes of the meetings, an original extraction and residence 
certificate issued from Fokontany and finally the tax position of the company.  
Given the note from the Ministry of Commerce and the General Secretariat of 
Commerce on 18 October 2010 for the regional directorate of the Analamanga 
trade: all operators are informed that in case of cessation of activity or bankruptcy, 
the return of the CIPENS card and / or accreditation card to the regional directorate 
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of the Analamanga trade is, given the regulations, mandatory. In conclusion, any 
violation of these provisions will lead to sanctions. The regional directorate of the 
Analamanga trade has identified in its register the 121 CIPENS card applications 
issued by Chinese investors since 1982.  
Once regulated in the host country as investors or employees, various Chinese 
actors will be structured in an expatriate community settling mainly in the shopping 
districts of Antananarivo and in particular in Behoririka’s. Buildings where 
Chinese traders live to organize their activity are also the places where they hire 
Chinese and Malagasy employees as resellers. They have made their home around 
Behoririka in small flats near their workplaces. In the suburbs of Antananarivo, 
Behoririka, Analakely and Soarano, Chinese shops are located around two five-
story buildings that dominate the area. They have mainly developed the first 
building. These buildings house on each floor, several point-of-sale for 
manufactured products from China. The acquisition of these buildings by Chinese 
migrants is the result of negotiations with members of wealthy Malagasy 
industrialist families called Ramaroson. As for the housings adjacent to the Chinese 
shops they have been rented and / or sold by a handful of entrepreneurs and 
investors – as Chinese newcomers in the last decade – to the local bourgeoisie. The 
purchase of these houses by Chinese traders in this respect was an important step in 
the socio-economic anchor of the new Chinese migrants settled in the capital of 
Madagascar between 2003 and 2012.  
During this stage, first through their investments in real estate, the Chinese 
newcomers had now a base home. And in a second time, they could guarantee the 
arrival of future expatriates, while ensuring a place to dwell – this in addition to a 
sales job to be filled immediately – once there. In fact, an effective social solidarity 
seems to bring to the Chinese community of Behoririka an internal coherence. The 
socio-economic anchor of the new Chinese migrants of Madagascar has only been 
possible thanks to a disruption of the existing social hierarchy that was prior to 
their arrival in the field of economic and business capital. As seen previously, these 
newcomers were led to gradually replace the old local bourgeoisie in Behoririka, 
because of the inability of the latter to follow the price leadership of Chinese 
traders without causing the ruin of their own business. Because of this spatial 
occupation and eviction of their main competitors: this phenomenon constantly 
attracts a succession of Chinese newcomers continuing to expand the number of 
expatriates. It also confirms the ascendancy of the Chinese community on their 
main competitors Merina and Karana, while promoting the movement of capital 
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from China in and around the Malagasy city. Finally, it can be said that this anchor 
resulted in a recast of forces at work in Behoririka, and in the emergence of a new 
type of monopoly held this time by Chinese businessmen. 
As the focal point for the first investors in the 1990s, the district of Behoririka now 
allows Chinese trade to compartmentalize itself even within the occupied place, 
and leads to other adjoining market squares such as the market of 
Andranvoahangy, a market located in an area called the 67 hectares area as well as 
the market of Pochard and the Isotry’s one. In 2010, other Chinese investors have 
been welcomed by the former Minister of Public Works, on June 16th, to finance 
future projects related to the economy. From Behoririka to Tsiazotafo: 
- Tana Centre; 
- Irresistible; 
- Globe; 
- Venic (Chaussurama); 
- Golden Centre; 
- Advance Centre; 
- Chinese hair salon. 
From Behoririka to the city of Ankadifotsy: 
- C GL (Computer and Hi Fi Center); 
- Hi Fi Sarl King Lot IB 80 Bis; 
- Supermarket Provident; 
- SIMA-IMMO (Sino-Malagasy company specializing in real estate) Sarl Lot 
IVF10; 
- Digital City. 
In these places sometimes located in the outskirts, sometimes in the heart of 
Behoririka, other Chinese traders spread this form of economic and commercial 
expansion at the edge of the Malagasy capital, while small coastal resellers do the 
same with their own customers. 
The point is this Chinese trade manages to dominate this sector below the city 
centre, and also extends itself beyond the limits of Antananarivo – including 
through the street retailers from the coast – because the first Chinese expatriates 
were smart enough to cultivate good relationships with the “key actors” of the 
Malagasy capital. As resource persons, the illicit street vendors have acquired a 
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good knowledge of tananarivian market and an accurate reading of its various 
irregularities since their arrival in the city centre. 
Creating networks among retailers clearly favours the resale of basic products 
imported from China and this has once again allowed Chinese traders to 
unquestionably ensure their domination. Therefore, it is no happenstance if the 
district of Behoririka has been chosen by the Chinese community as business 
location. 
Chinese shops are starting to take by storm Isotry market; a market mainly 
structured by Karana traders. This supermarket is kept by Chinese operators who 
import their supplies mainly from China. They essentially sell I'gasy electronic 
products from mobile phones, computers, monitors, television, hi-fi to cameras and 
laptops. The brand belongs to the contractor Bao Lai, one of the largest fortunes in 
Madagascar. 
Other chain stores belonging to Bao Lai are installed throughout the ground floor 
of Independence Avenue. It seems that Chinese shopkeepers take gradually Isotry 
market, and this after having conquered the market of Behoririka. As mentioned 
above, small Malagasy retailers present in the capital, come mainly from the 
impoverished Malagasy coasts. They are the people who are busy at dawn before 
the Chinese shops where they buy great quantities of wholesale goods before 
selling them at retail on roadsides to customers beyond Antananarivo. Therefore, 
although it is not conspicuous, the contribution of local dealers is crucial. In other 
words, without them – that is to say, deprived of these internal ramifications in 
Antananarivo and of its various external joints in the city centre – the Chinese trade 
of Madagascar would probably not have expanded so rapidly, even more so beyond 
the capital. Moreover, if the Chinese trade is so flourishing in and beyond 
Antananarivo this is also due to the fact that it allows to stem from the rising prices 
of basic products. 
As a matter of fact, from China, manufacturers take on responsibility of providing 
Chinese operators in Madagascar with bulky freight for importing products to the 
port of Tamatave. And nationals can be constantly supplied according to their 
orders. Compared to the Senegalese situation and because of the geographical 
proximity between Madagascar and China, migration flows from the Middle 
Kingdom are much more frequent, more numerous and therefore more conspicuous 
in the Malagasy capital than in Dakar. Located on the eastern interface of the 
island, the port of Tamatave facilitates the access to capital, to products and to 
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Chinese actors in Madagascar that transit by cargo through the Indian Ocean. 
Consequently, the Malagasy port area acts as a gateway for Chinese manufactured 
products. From Antananarivo, the port of Tamatave is six or seven hours away by 
car and one hour by plane. The relative proximity allows Chinese traders settled in 
Behoririka to send convoys to the portuary axis where the berthed vessels 
containing the various orders for manufactured products can be found. In short, the 
supply of Chinese shopkeepers based in Antananarivo is organized in the context 
of a traffic that extends from the place of manufacture of manufactured products, 
located in China to then go through the port of Tamatave, before being received as 
cargoes in Antananarivo. 
All things considered, the local implementation of new Chinese migrants in 
Antananarivo from 2003 to 2012 was primarily made through traders who 
previously invested funds to settle down in Antananarivo. Indeed, through them, 
the successive migratory waves will gradually incorporate the Chinese community 
of Antananarivo. These Chinese merchants were able to unite around them contacts 
to optimize the sales of their products manufactured at low prices and oust, at the 
same time the Malagasy competitors of Antananarivo. It is clear that this choice 
has proven successful, as these contacts – namely, the small coastal retailers – are 
unique when it comes to meet their clients at the right time, and to get to key places 
of the capital, in the purpose to sell regular China’s imports. Furthermore, in 
accordance with clichés that are usually fed about them, Chinese expatriate traders 
of Madagascar appear to be innovative workers. However, the Malagasy traders 
seem less inclined to work with the Chinese retailers from Antananarivo mentioned 
above. The fact that Chinese traders make it far more affordable than their 
competitors from Madagascar to buy imported Chinese goods seems to seriously 
threaten the local handicraft (a production that seems to be of a higher standard, 
only because of the quality of raw materials from Madagascar), and create a 
situation of economic and commercial monopoly in the capital. 
 
4. The Socio-Economic Homesteading of Chinese Migrants in Senegal 
(2003-2013) 
As part of this South-south inter-continental migration, some Chinese migrants will 
be led to meet other migrants of Africa whose itinerary is different from theirs 
(Perrot, 2009). As for the intra-continental migration to Dakar, it is rather a rural 
exodus: the starting point is the groundnut basin area, and Dakar the point of 
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destination. Striking event of the twentieth century, the economic hardship of the 
1980s led many Senegalese – the Modu- Modu – to leave home and find work in 
the capital, and thus supplement the active members in a family nucleus by dealing 
with daily needs. Indeed, the use of the latter has been weakened because of the 
budget and expenditures restrictive measures, which also led many African pupils 
and students to drop out of school. As a consequence, different households located 
in rural areas and the provinces had to face up this situation. 
However, the actual deterioration of the socio-economic context strikes both cities 
and provinces. This is why, migrant workers whether previously schooled or not, 
had to take the necessary steps to face social disruption. This means that hiring, 
including in large cities, has become more difficult given the number of migrants 
who are now in the centre. In order to remedy this situation, the intra-continental 
migrant workers have chosen to retrain – retraining in which women have a place 
(Sen, 1999, pp. 123) – in the trade as itinerant tradesmen, an informal status that 
allowed them to receive an income without having to pay taxes. They are the ones 
who will later benefit from the influx of Chinese traders from the 2000s, to become 
their major clients and fill their moneybags. As for The Baol - Baol – namely, the 
Lebanese and Senegalese traders – they are in a different perspective. The Baol-
Baol movements have been studied on many occasions. They have been discussed 
in several approaches. Thus, from a historical perspective, some researchers have 
tried to show the migration paths of Baol-Baol since the birth of Mouridism, 
through the development of peanut cultivation, until the exodus to Dakar and then 
abroad. 
They clearly cope with this South–South migration flow. It is not only the 
competition they are bound to that undermines their interests. Indeed, the Baol-
Baol are confronted with a kind of power embodied in a collective being: a host of 
Chinese migrants acting in networks, exercising a singular influence horizontally 
and privately. Under the presidency of Abdoulaye Wade, more favourable to the 
Middle Kingdom than his predecessors, the Sino-Senegalese relations were 
resumed during the liberalization and economic opening of the Senegalese private 
sector. In accordance with the economic and commercial turning point wanted by 
Beijing, the terms of the Sino-Senegalese cooperation will fit into this perspective: 
three stadiums are currently being renovated by Chinese companies, and no less 
than eleven new stadiums are under construction. This China’s African policy 
manages to seduce the most senior African dignitaries because its offer adequately 
respond to the specific needs of its partners namely, a relatively low 
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industrialization and deficiencies in infrastructure, and this, without political 
conditionalities. The work in progress of the National Theatre in Dakar meets in 
turn a different logic; it is an integral part of the construction projects of prestigious 
buildings which purpose is to expose to the world the know-how of Chinese 
architects. By maintaining – what obviously appears as a constant in China’s 
African politics – unbeatable prices and a speed of execution from its workers, 
Beijing highlights these two pillars to attract future clients. In this sense, in the year 
2005, several agreements were signed between the two political systems, which 
include agreement on major loans: the installation of a central Dakar, to strengthen 
and renew networks and the aging electrical wiring of the capital. 
How Beijing manages to reconcile these two requirements at the heart of an 
important foreign policy (Hibou, 2011, pp. 6)? Obviously, the downside of the 
latter has to be updated. Indeed, within the huge construction sites, the Chinese 
workers are paid very little compared to the difficulty of the work performed. 
Indeed, most of the workers do the dirty work without sophisticated equipments. 
They allow themselves but few breaks and work without necessarily wearing 
headgear and without worrying about the sun above their heads. In addition, piled 
up on each other – for the entire duration of their contract – in habitats, adjacent 
buildings and sometimes, in unhealthy dormitories, they live behind closed doors. 
As total wage-bill, these employees make up a low cost and are extremely 
profitable for the foremen who employ them. In sum, whether in terms of hardship, 
insecurity and wage amount, it seems that the Chinese expatriate workers do not 
have their say. Indeed, given the more than modest social origin of the coolies, they 
do not have the possibility to refuse such working conditions. In addition, these 
contractors make little use of machines because they rely primarily on the strength 
and hard work of these employees. 
Initially, a few pioneers were already in Dakar since 1990 and well before the 
Chinese newcomers in Senegal since October 25 2005, but these two waves of 
migration come from Henan province. It is likely that the first Chinese have 
uncovered the best opportunities, both in terms of purchase or rental of housing and 
for business as such. Chinese traders and entrepreneurs settled down in the 2000s. 
They constitute the bulk of the Chinese newcomers in Dakar who engage in 
mercantilism, around which crawl a multitude of small Senegalese resellers. There 
are over a hundred Chinese merchants, from Papa Gueye Fall driveway to 
Centennial Avenue, in the city of Dakar, where these two categories of actors come 
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together regularly. Obviously, some Senegalese can be counted among employees 
working in these outlets. This studied area now hosts the largest Chinese 
community in Dakar, while Independence Avenue was originally a tourist place. It 
is noteworthy that Chinese traders’ choice of location is clearly not down to 
chance. “Centrally located, the boulevard is surrounded by major markets: Sandaga 
Colobane, HLM, Tilène.” (Diop, 2011, pp. 73). A variety of manufactured products 
as diverse as clothing, locks, shoes, sandals, loincloths, plastic toys, small portraits 
with images of the Baye Fall and Murid marabouts, clocks or kitchen utensils 
(Kernen, 2008, pp. 79), made in China before being widely sold in the heart of the 
Senegalese market at unbeatable prices can be found. More discreetly, in the 
1990s, and then massively over the years 2000 to 2005, Chinese traders have 
bought most of the ground floors, patios or garages of Independence Avenue to 
settle there and do business. For most traders, the man came first and set up the 
shop, and then the woman came and joined him. Later still, if the deal goes, a 
cousin will come and assist them. 
The aim of the Chinese newcomers is to delegate the management of the business 
as quickly as possible to their relatives to be supplemented in this task. The state of 
mind that drives and structures the group and also promotes its cohesion is that 
both employers and employees take part in these challenges. In this sense, the 
collective emulation that is unfolded on a daily basis motivates the members of the 
expatriate community: if the boss lived in a spacious villa while his employees 
were forced to stay under stringent conditions, this state of mind would be lost. As 
for Western bosses, they tend to lead a lavish lifestyle in the most beautiful African 
hotels, or in residential areas, thus living far from local realities. “Chinese from 
Dakar live near their stores in the Colobane and Medina neighbourhoods (...).” 
(Bredeloup, 2006, pp. 211). Chinese were stuffed into sorts of crowded dormitories 
or settlements that were nothing less than unhealthy. Gradually, by renting the two-
story buildings that line both sides of the avenue, they were able to settle on the 
spot, and thus became key economic actors from the centre of Dakar, from which a 
huge quantity of products manufactured throughout the territory and beyond are 
sold. Whether they are stalls or furnished shops, some outlets are rented or sold at a 
good price to Chinese traders. 
The bordering owners of these properties – i.e.: ground floor, sheds, patios and 
garages of Independence Avenue – are former executives of the Senegalese public 
service or retirees who used to work in the private sector and had experienced the 
post-independence period. These future stores of about 16 square meters, which 
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were previously leased for a monthly cost up to 15,000 CFA francs, are currently 
leased or sold to Chinese merchants at a rate two to three times the original cost. In 
other words, these rents represent a significant source of income for these former 
employees. Beyond the financial aspect, it is noteworthy that the discreet behaviour 
of the future residents of the avenue, to say the least, seems to have worked in their 
favour in order to acquire such property. Once there, it was of paramount 
importance for Chinese traders to attract and keep their Senegalese customers 
which was far from being easy given the local competition they had to face. 
However, breaking the market prices and competing on the variety of products 
(although the quality of the products cannot be taken for granted), Asian merchants 
have succeeded within five years to attract on the one hand, many Senegalese 
consumers whose purchasing power was, until then, far from enough. And on the 
other hand, the street vendors have also found their needs catered as far as the 
selling prices offered by Chinese shopkeepers are concerned. In this sense, what 
was supposed to be at first a road shopping district has gradually become a 
stronghold for the Chinese trade in Dakar. As a matter of fact, while strolling on 
Centennial Avenue, many stalls of manufactured products imported from China 
held by Senegalese resellers can be found. They purchase greater quantities of 
Chinese products than any other consumer. Note that some shops located near the 
Chinese shops are run by Senegalese. It is suspected that these new owners and / or 
tenants were former street retailers who have managed to set up their own business 
thanks to the Chinese economic implantation in Dakar. Somehow, the presence of 
these street dealers increases Chinese trade in Dakar, and hence suit the businesses 
of Chinese traders, fortiori, when they belong to the Murid and Baye Fall 
brotherhood. Indeed, these two religious groups are respectively driven by the 
same mystical work, and are skilled in a specific discipline.  
In order to manage their different institutions on a daily basis, Chinese actors have 
chosen to reside in the surroundings of Centenaire Avenue. Given the age of the 
Chinese businesses located throughout the Papa Gueye Fall driveway, if compared 
to the Centenaire driveway, we will use the term of stalls to designate these small 
places run by Chinese actors, these shops are less busy – both in terms of clients, 
diverse goods and Senegalese staff – than the shops. For example, the stores have 
equipped warehouses.  
By contrast, as far as the new institutions on Centenaire Avenue are concerned, we 
will rather call them shops, knowing that unlike stalls, shopkeepers seem to be able 
to count Senegalese vendors among them. Even if most of the best sellers of 
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Senegalese origin have been employed in some of the shops on the shopping street, 
the owners of these outlets are Chinese. The fact of selling the same items than 
their local competitors, by breaking the sales price, gives a near-monopoly to 
Chinese traders. Their task is all the more made easier because among vendors they 
hire on site, those who are hired are among the best ones on the market. This is 
why “the Chinese staff does not take centre stage in the stalls of Dakar. “In 
addition, they act as interpreters to overcome the ignorance of the national 
languages of their bosses. Since manufactured products are sold at low cost, it 
becomes very difficult for Senegalese buyers / consumers to negotiate lower prices. 
Located in Yiwu for Chinese and Dubai for their Lebanese and Senegalese 
competitors, supplies places vary according to traders. Cargo containers come 
every day to replenish Chinese shops of the avenue, whereas Senegalese and 
Lebanese traders used to go and buy their products by themselves in China. Beijing 
has found it more appropriate to manage these sectors itself. According to the idea 
of just-in-time production, Chinese traders place their orders on the spot that is to 
say, in China, speaking directly to their suppliers or from their place of residence, 
to, a priori embassies. Regardless of the process, the materials for the production of 
manufactured goods are sent by shiploads in spare parts to the port of Dakar in 
containers. In short, suppliers constantly supply Chinese traders settled there, 
according to their respective claims. Once the delivery is received, the products are 
put together before being sold, avoiding at the same time the shipping costs. As 
such, the most important customers for the sustainability for the business of 
Chinese newcomers do not lie on the side of Senegalese buyers / consumers who 
buy products in single, but on the side of the buyers / retailers to whom they 
negotiate wholesale prices, who are responsible to sell the products themselves. In 
terms of profitability and flow of stocks, the role of buyers / retailers is hence 
crucial for the success of Chinese business. 
Once the Senegalese retailers have opened an “account” with them, they take a 
shipment of items to resell them. But initially, the new Senegalese resellers need to 
be introduced by the oldest retailers to start working. And it is only later that the 
network functions. In a way, the old resellers are a guarantee for the newcomers, 
considering that Chinese traders can not so easily sell their products without 
intermediaries. On the other hand, Senegalese resellers will not waste their own 
livelihood. So in the morning resellers take their pack of goods in Chinese shops, 
and when the whole of the merchandise has been sold, they come to replenish 
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supplies again giving back unsold items. Once the relationship is established the 
network works almost by itself. 
As for Senegalese buyers / resellers, they have all the necessary latitude to set the 
profit margin they will make out of their street hawking. Indeed, the informal 
nature, or the other side of this business, gives buyers / consumers the opportunity 
to negotiate or revise downward the prices offered by buyers / resellers without 
necessarily having door slammed as it is the case when dealing with Chinese 
traders. Regarding the Senegalese buyers / retailers of Murid and Baye Fall 
obedience, work is seen as a form of purification to which the believer must submit 
and this singularly spiritual representation of labour increases members’ efficiency 
in their daily tasks, especially in the context of trade. Many Murid have opted for 
informal trade. And gradually, they took control of the Dakar economy through 
networking activities, to such an extent that some of them have migrated to the 
United States and Italy. In that same informal sector, the Baye Fall brotherhood is 
not far behind. Somehow, these buyers / resellers soften the production circuit 
organized by the Chinese during the sale, streamlining the flow of manufactured 
goods. However, residential buyers / resellers, whose stalls manufactures are 
located near the Chinese shops, and throughout Centenaire Avenue, have, it seems, 
far less flexibility compared to those who choose to sell their products as hawkers. 
In addition, the fact of knowing precisely the dates and places where national 
holidays (April 4), religious (Eid El Kebir), holidays, weddings and other events 
are celebrated, increases Senegalese retailers efficiency. Because of these 
parameters, resellers are prominent for the success of Chinese's trade. Moreover, as 
previously seen, not only the avenue is surrounded by major business centres such 
as Tilène, Sandaga and Colobane (Coumba Diop, 1981, pp. 90) but in extenso, 
Chinese manufactured products can also circulate in neighbouring regions namely, 
Gambia, Mali, Guinea- Bissau, Guinea- Conakry and Sierra Leone.  
As for the conflicts that may arise in the context of the relationships between 
Senegalese and Chinese from Dakar, it seems they may be generated by Senegalese 
traders and entrepreneurs. Indeed, the big losers in this economic liberalization 
orchestrated by Abdoulaye Wade are local craftsmen, that is to say, shoemakers or 
weavers, who saw their sales literally collapse from the years 2000-2005, time 
when their Chinese competitors arrived in the capital of Dakar. The Unacois 
(National Union of Traders and Industrialists of Senegal) said that competition is 
unfair and prejudicial to the Senegalese entrepreneurs who previously exercised a 
monopoly on trade in Dakar, because the Chinese have no annual charges and do 
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not take real risks when opening their shops because local authorities turn a blind 
eye on the illegal practices and encourage the arrival of Chinese migrants in 
Senegal. According to the representatives of the Unacois, many traders and local 
craftsmen have ceased their activities because of these Chinese newcomers since 
2005. It even seems that some crafts have been plagiarized by Chinese traders who 
then sold them on the market without paying any user fees. For some of these 
crafts, it is a whole know-how that tends to disappear in favour of large Chinese 
distribution network which size is such that it is difficult to cope with. Indeed, the 
Senegalese weavers focus on the quality / price ratio. However, despite a better 
quality than the Chinese textile ones, Senegalese buyers / consumers have a 
preference for products imported from China. De facto, the Senegalese and 
Lebanese traders adapt to the Chinese presence by diversifying storehouses. In 
sum, the Senegalese artisanal sector is a victim of counterfeiting organized by 
manufacturers in China and Chinese traders expatriates in Africa, who reproduce 
several copies of traditional clothing models from the African market in order to 
sell them in the same market without any intervention from the authorities. 
Eventually, if not heard by governments that hide in silence, these complaints are 
likely to escalate. It is quite possible that the Unacois takes resolutions, by 
committing acts of vandalism against Chinese shops. Paradoxically, the same 
indifference can be observed from the part of huaquio against Chinese trader 
expatriates and their possible grievances.  
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